The Market — Music Catalogues as Financial Assets
A $30 billion revenue stream attracting institutional capital
Global recorded music revenues reached $29.6 billion in 2024, the tenth consecutive year of growth. Streaming alone accounted for $20.4 billion, with 752 million subscribers worldwide. Catalogue music — tracks older than 18 months — now accounts for over 70% of all streaming consumption.1
These characteristics make music rights attractive to institutional investors: the cash flows are long-duration (copyright extends 70+ years), inflation-linked, diversified across platforms and territories, and largely uncorrelated with economic cycles. Academic research shows music consumption actually increases during downturns.2
Since 2019, over $20 billion in confirmed capital has been deployed into music rights acquisitions. The buyers are no longer just music companies — pension funds, private equity firms, sovereign wealth vehicles, and ABS investors now compete for catalogue assets. Concord's July 2025 securitisation, backed by 1.3 million copyrights, raised $1.765 billion across tranches maturing over five, seven, and ten years. It was the largest music ABS ever issued. SESAC's $889 million securitisation was oversubscribed three times.2
| Transaction | Year | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Concord ABS (1.3M copyrights) | 2025 | $1.765 billion |
| Queen (Sony / Apollo) | 2024 | $1.27 billion |
| Warner Music / Bain Capital JV | 2024 | $1.2 billion |
| SESAC whole business securitisation | 2025 | $889 million |
| Michael Jackson (50% stake to Sony) | 2024 | $600 million |
| Bruce Springsteen | 2021 | $500 million |
The mid-tier opportunity
The headline deals get the attention, but the real opportunity — and the real problem — sits lower in the market.
The top twenty confirmed transactions account for roughly 61% of total disclosed capital. The remaining 39%, and the vast majority of catalogues by count, sits in the $1–50 million range. These mid-tier catalogues offer higher yields (5–10x NPS multiples versus 14–18x for iconic catalogues) with natural diversification benefits.2
But this is precisely the segment where standardised risk assessment does not exist. The due diligence cost structure — $100K–$300K regardless of deal size — makes it economically impossible to evaluate a $5M catalogue with the same rigour applied to a $500M deal.
The capital wants in. It just cannot price what it is buying.
Valuation depends on metadata
Current market multiples for evergreen catalogues cluster around 14–18x Net Publisher's Share, implying unlevered yields of roughly 5–7%. But these valuations assume the underlying metadata is correct — that the royalties being projected will actually flow to the buyer.2
The Hipgnosis Songs Fund demonstrated what happens when this assumption breaks down. An independent forensic review in 2024 revealed that 67 of 105 acquisitions had been overvalued, 75% of the portfolio was missing growth forecasts, and the gap between two independent valuations of the same assets was $690 million. Blackstone eventually acquired the fund at a discount to both figures.3
This was not fraud. It was the predictable outcome of a market where there is no standardised way to measure the quality of what is being bought.
How capital flows through the music rights market
The diagram above simplifies a system that involves hundreds of collecting societies, multiple royalty types (mechanical, performance, synchronisation, neighbouring rights), and territory-by-territory administration. The complexity of this pipeline is precisely why metadata quality determines whether royalties reach the correct rights holder — or disappear into suspense accounts.
Next: The Solution — How TrackForge Rates a Catalogue
Sources and notes